JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. H louses were rarely bought or rented on the market but allocated by the authorities. Yet, families were allowed to own a house and the construction of one's own house was even supported by the system in its latter years. However, because of the extreme shortage of all necessary materials, it was hard to build such houses. In the cities, most houses were community or state property. Houses were not attractive as private property because they were costly and difficult to maintain. It is harder to find information on the distribution of housing of different quality. The fact that larger houses were assigned for rent to families with more children meant that differences in income were only weakly related to differences in the size of accommodation (Hinrichs, 1992;Weidacher, 1992: 322). Logan and Bian (1993) report clear social and political 242
differences in access to quality housing and neighbourhoods in other socialist countries that seem to stem from the employer's influence over housing allocation and its role in the recruitment of loyal or key personnel and the rewards they received.
How successful the GDR regime was in its attempt to avoid social segregation between neighbourhoods and to promote the mixing of classes within neighbourhoods can only be glimpsed from anecdotal evidence. In fact, it was a newspaper clipping on the peculiar relationships between socially very dissimilar neighbours in Moscow that sparked our research into relationships among neighbours in communist society. Later in this paper we will present evidence on how well the GDR's Marxist regime succeeded in actually mixing social classes within the neighbourhood.
Apart from the more explicit goals of achieving welfare, equality, and friendship between classes, the regime also aimed to organize social life entirely according to the socialist ideology. This included the private sphere of family life as well as the more public sphere of work. Communist regimes intruded into the private and work spheres not only to re-educate the 'old man'and to create the 'new man' but also to control the population in order to ensure continuing power. The centralized assignment of housing was instrumental in achieving political control: loyal citizens were put next-door to those whom the regime did not trust (Childs, 1983) . To break the private character of the family and support the development of a socialist lifestyle, house and neighbourhood committees were formed. Like the collectives at work, these committees were encouraged to keep diaries of their activities, to establish a programme of activities, to elect chairpersons, and to meet regularly. Hausgemeinschaften ('house committees') that were rragerdes sogialistischen Gemeinschaftslebens im Wohngebiet ('pillars of the socialist community in the residential area') are illustrative of the organized political control exercised over citizens (KleBman, 1988) . Such groups organized leisure time activities such as reading, political discussions, and festivities, as well as voting.
Voters are often organized to go to the poll in groups .... The secretary [of the house committee] is a reliable collaborator of the National Front .... he keeps an eye on things in his block and attempts to mobilize the tenants to take part in all appropriate political activities. Competitions are organized to see which block gets its full complement of voters to the polls first. Arrangements are made to get the votes of the sick or infirm, of those on shift work, or those who are, for some reason, away from home. In these circumstances a voter would feel intimidated if he had any thoughts of abstaining. He would fear being obstructed by his neighbours, people he probably did not know before he moved into the flat, people whose private political views he does not know. (Childs, 1983:132) .
The 'housebook' (Hausbuch), or diary of the house committee was part of the registration law: every housing unit had to have one. The particulars of all persons living in the house, including those who visited them, had to be registered in this book.1 Particularly active committees were rewarded with the 'golden house number', which they could mount at the entrance of the building. In small towns the number of house or neighbourhood committees was never very great, but in the bigger cities there were many of them, particularly in new suburbs. House committees were a subtle instrument in exerting implicit and explicit social pressure to conform. They were also the expression of the regime's distrust of its own citizens.
One can therefore say that the allotment of housing in the former GDR served a number of purposes: it guaranteed a minimum level of housing for everybody; prevented social segregation; secured the mixing of social classes; and made it possible to exercise political control. Marxist elites attempted to mould actual relations among citizens by controlling the selection of people into neighbourhoods, i.e. by controlling who met whom. Bearing these considerations in mind, it would be surprising if neighbourhood relationships had not been affected by such a housing policy. Relationships with neighbours differ from relationships individuals have with their friends, acquaintances, or colleagues, in the sense that it is actually impossible not to have neighbours. Relationships between neighbours have no predefined content and are almost never a question of an entirely voluntary choice. If there is a housing market, one can select oneself into a particular neighbourhood or even sometimes next to a particular neighbour, but in a state-or party-controlled system, this is not feasible. Furthermore, although one cannot choose the members of one's family, one can still avoid meeting them, but one can hardly avoid meeting one's neighbours. Whether 'meeting' will lead to 'mating' is, however, another question (see Verbrugge, 1977) . Before formulating hypotheses on neighbourhood relations in the former GDR, we will first review what is already known about relationships between neighbours.
Previous Research Findings on Relations between Neighbours
The research literature on neighbourhood relations is not extensive and is mainly restricted to the US. As far as 'meeting' between neighbours is concerned, there is a specialist literature on ethnic segregation between and within neighbourhoods (e.g. Wilson, 1987 ; Massey and Denton, 1993), but there are few studies on the occupational segregation of neighbourhoods. Those that do exist are mainly rather dated (e.g. Duncan and Duncan, 1955) . With regard to'mating' between neighbours, there is an older tradition of studies on friendships, which showed, inter alia, that people tend to become friends with their nearest neighbours (e.g. Merton, 1947; Caplow and Foreman, 1950 ). More recent social network studies also include information on the actual social contacts between neighbours (e.g. Fischer, 1982) . Recent studies on the so-called gentrification of old, rundown urban centres (e.g. Bridge, 1994 ) sometimes contain information on networks in the neighbourhood.Yet, from the beginning of research on neighbours, there are hardly any studies that contains information on both'meeting'and 'mating' (see Keller, 1968) .
It is hazardous to compare existing studies and to generalize from them because of the different designs and measurement tools involved and because of conceptual differences. Some studies only deal with the people living in a particular street, while others are concerned with a representative urban or national sample of inhabitants and their neighbours. Another hindrance is that the geographical scale on which segregation is measured differs from study to study, although this is known to influence the degree of segregation one will find. Studies also differ in their definition of 'neighbours'. Fischer (1982: 41) found that his respondents in urban California had an average of 1.9 neighbours in their network, i.e. 10 per cent. Busschbach (1996) reports a similar figure for the Netherlands. According to the General Social Survey (GSS), the core network of people in the US contained an average of 7 per cent of neighbours with whom personal problems were discussed (Marsden, 1990 ; see Burt, 1984 for more information on the GSS). The California respondents studied by Fischer (1982: 386) Bridge (1994) show that the number of neighbours mentioned differs among social groups. For instance, young and old people have more neighbourhood contacts than others. Families with children and women are more involved in their neighbourhood. In addition, length of residence is an important factor in explaining neighbourhood relationships. According to Fischer (1982: 100) homogeneity of lifestyles is a particularly important factor leading to neighbourhood involvement. Because lower-income neighbourhoods are often rather diverse with regard to racial, occupational, and other characteristics, these places tend to be characterized by less neighbourhood involvement while higher-income groups and those with a higher level of education more often mention neighbours in their network. In addition, persons with a higher income and education have more freedom of choice, that is, they can arrange to live nextdoor to similar others.Yet, the larger neighbour network of persons with a higher education or a job with higher occupational prestige is not accompanied by more intense or frequent contact with these neighbours. People of a higher social class mention more neighbours, but have little face-to-face contact, whereas people of the lower classes do not mention many neighbours but activate these networks more frequently and have closer relationships with their neighbours. Campbell (1990) also reports that people who own their house have more'elaborate'social relations within their neighbourhood.
The studies of neighbour relationships reviewed above either concentrate on the social composition of neighbourhoods, i.e. the different chances of meeting one's neighbours or they consider actual ties existing among neighbours as a part of an individual's personal network, i.e. mating. To our knowledge there are only three studies that analyse both'meeting'and 'mating' between neighbours.
Athanasiou and Yoshioka (1973) in a study of 300 households in a new settlement tried to determine how much variation in friendship formation is due to propinquity and how much to similarity in social class. Friendships are influenced by propinquity: more numerous and more intense friendships are formed with immediately adjacent neighbours. Class was not a factor in differentiating friendship choice for next-door neighbours, however, at greater distance it did become a factor.
In his study of 22 city blocks of 12 houses in Amsterdam ( = 196) Nauta (1973: 107-42) reported that the social dissimilarity of people living there was not very high, that they actually interacted with on average almost 7 other neighbours. Furthermore, existing differences in occupational status between neighbours had no influence on intimate contacts, but they did decrease the exchange of instrumental help. An interesting finding in this paper is that quarrels between neighbours do not vary according to social class (Nauta, 1973: 68-9 
Relations with Neighbours as Social Capital
Even if a regime were successful in mixing the neighbourhood socially,4 it cannot be taken for granted that 'meeting' implies 'mating' and less so, we will argue, in a communist society. People's interactions are not totally determined by the supply side (Marsden, 1990 There are at least two ways in which personal networks in all societies are instrumental in the achievement of better life chances, that is, for achieving physical well-being and social approval. Although the sociological theory of social approval is still underdeveloped, it is probably correct to assume that in general similar others are more important in attaining social approval if only because it is easier to communicate with similar others. A more diverse network is, in general, probably more instrumental in achieving physical wellbeing. We argue, however, that the instrumental value of networks in producing these goals is conditioned by their specific institutional conditions in the former GDR.
A dominant characteristic of communist societies was that the communist command economies induced an 'economy of shortage' (Kornai, 1980) , which constantly posed problems for individuals in terms of guaranteeing a basic level of material wellbeing. A common solution to these problems was the creation of a personal network that could provide an individual with a variety of goods and services that were difficult to obtain, since they could not be got in the shops or through official channels. Such provision networks were well known in the former GDR and are often referred to in the literature (e.g. Voigt etal., 1987; KleBmann, 1988; Gutenberg and Neef, 1990; Srubar, 1991; Volker etal., 1992) . In an economy of shortage a diverse net-work is practically indispensable in guaranteeing and even increasing one's well-being, because such a network would provide access to a greater variety of scarce goods and services that cannot be attained otherwise. Previous research has shown (e.g. Diewald, 1995) that people did indeed create'provision networks' (BeschaffungsnetZwerke) to compensate for the economy of shortage. Moreover, it has been shown that these provision networks were occupationally very dissimilar (see Volker, 1995; Volker and Flap, 1995b) . Therefore, even apart from the stimulating effect of nearness on interaction, if it were only for the economy of shortage and if the official housing policy were only half-way successful in providing equal access to housing for people with different social backgrounds, and given the instrumental value of occupationally diverse networks, we can expect to find many contacts among neighbours in theformer GDR before thepolitical pheaval.
As already mentioned, social relationships also provide approval, another major human goal. Although social relations in every society contribute to social approval, by providing company and helping to create an identity, the institutional context of a communist societyalso has specific consequences for the kind of networks instrumental in producing this goal in everyday social life. This other systeminduced characteristic of communist societies that greatly affected social relationships was the regime's extensive apparatus of control. Neighbourhoods could easily be kept under surveillance and controlled by placing the 'right' people next-door to each other. In our pilot study, in spring 1991, it turned out that people were aware of this state control. They assumed that in every house committee and work collective at least one person was an informant working for the security police, the STASI. Respondents described this feeling in statements like: 'Whenever more than ten people came together, one of the group worked for the Stasi'. We do not exactly know how many unofficial informants the STASI employed. Estimates vary from 12.5 per cent (see Feffer, 1992: 82, quoting the New YorkTimes and Esquire) to 1 per cent of the total population (news-reels on German public television broadcast on 8 February 1994). We will probably never know the exact figure, but the numbers were certainly quite considerable. Moreover, the fear instilled by a secret police force and their hidden informants is not a linear function of their number, as a small number of persons who cannot be trusted can already cause considerable fear. The problem of whom to trust arose because individuals did not know who in fact worked for the STASI. After the STASI archives were opened many people learned that they had put too much trust in individuals they thought were their friends.
Many tried to escape this control and collectivization by retreating into a cocoon of trusted friends and family members.These'niches'were not only a refuge from the waygovernment meddled in the lives of citizens, but can also be seen as the solution to the system-induced problem of whom to trust. Intensive, long-standing relationships with others, embedded in strong ties, are less dangerous because people learn many things about each other directly or through common friends. Similarity probably also enhanced trustworthiness. Moreover, a strong tie gives people some leverage over each other, because they can always threaten to withhold support in the future. Everybody outside this inner core, this niche, could be dangerous or could become so. Thus approval could only safely be produced in 'niches' consisting of strong ties (seeVolker, 1995).
The assumptions just mentioned are an important caveat for the well-known 'strength-of-weak-ties' argument. Although weak ties generally do not provide much information, they pose a risk in oneparty states where being labelled a dissident or an enemy of the state has severe negative consequences for one's life chances and those of one's family. In societies ruled by state socialism the meaning of 'life chances' sometimes has to be taken literally. In such societies people probably developed a practical knowledge about the possible danger of weak ties, they knew that these ties might lead them into unfamiliar, and possibly the wrong circles. In addition, a weak tie does not give much leverage when it comes to influencing the decisions of others. Hence, the strength-of-weak-ties argument has quite other, and negative implications in communist societies than has generally been assumed. Many novels and even everyday expressions describe the strategies of GDR citizens as they tried to deal with the reality of political control and tried to keep niches separated from other, weak, and potentially risky relationships (such expressions are for example sich bedeckthaltenkeeping oneself covered or mit gwei Gesichtern lebenliving with two faces).
The political control did not only lead to a distrust of those one did not know very well, it also made individuals wary of those they were forced to meet because of the institutional circumstances, such as for example co-residents of the neighbourhood.
Concerning next-door neighbours there were probably other relevant factors: because they were in each other's vicinity almost all the time, and willingly or unwillingly they learned much about each others' private lives, including politically sensitive information such as whom they invited back to their homes. The regular meetings in neighbourhood committees and the relative lack of geographical mobility further increased opportunities to observe each other. Assuming that the state successfully prevented social segregation and was able to mix neighbourhoods, install party representatives on housing committees, and secretly place informants in the neighbourhood and on these committees, one might be justified in expectingfew contactsamongneighhours and especially among direct neighbours.
Although our assumption about the necessity of a diverse network as a means to ensure physical well-being led us to precisely the opposite hypothesis, we think that the problem of whom to trust overrode the other consideration, at least in the context of the neighbourhood. People will, we argue, adapt their provision network accordingly. To sum up our assumptions: we assume, first, that next-door neighbours were relatively dissimilar from each other with regard to their social background. Second, we expect that people attempted to avoid interactions with direct neighbours and probably also with other persons in the neighbourhood. The number of neighbours within the network will have been rather small, in an absolute and relative sense.Third, neighbours will not have been included in the core network, let alone in the 'niche'. In line with this, we expect that ties with neighbours will have been rather weak, or at least they will have been strong very rarely. Fourth, if there were contacts with neighbours, these would have been instrumental, weak relationships, and probably with others not too dissimilar from oneself. Fifth, if an individual did not have many others for the provision of scarce goods, and if neighbours could provide such resources, neighbours were more likely to be included as a substitute.
Design and Measurements
A pilot study was conducted in Spring 1991 to test a preliminary version of the questionnaire as well as to gather more background information on the situation in the former GDR before and after the political upheaval. In May 1992 we started the first fieldwork and conducted the first sample of interviews. This sample was reinterviewed in April 1993 when we also interviewed a new sample for the first time. In April and May 1994, the 'new' sample of April 1993 was reinterviewed and the 'old' sample of May 1992 was interviewed for the third time. The 1992 sample as well as the 1993 sample were randomly selected in Leipzig and Dresden by the civil service of the local municipalities. Criteria for inclusion were that respondents had to be between 30 and 55 years of age and to have been in employment before the political change. Table 1 depicts the research design for our studyAt tl we paid more attention to personal networks before the political changes and posed fewer questions on the actual situation. At t2 we focused strongly on the actual situation and only asked a subset of questions on the time before the political changes to allow us the option of checking on possible biases in our data caused by memory effects. Of course, we studied changes between tl and t2 as well as the occurrence of life events, such as marriage, giving birth and becoming a father or a mother, or the death of persons to whom an individual had felt very close.
We opted for this somewhat unorthodox design because it allowed us to control for the biases that might result from using retrospective questions (see Bernard etal., 1984) . If there is no bias because of cognitive filtering, respondents will mention similar retrospective networks at each point of measurement. Actually, we found no indication of systematic memory bias, except with regard to network size. In retrospect, people reported a somewhat larger retrospective network in 1992 than in 1993. In 1992 they stated that the mean size of their networks before the political upheaval in 1989 was 12.4 (sd=5.4, median= 12). One year later, in the 1993, sample mean size was recorded with an average of only 10.6 (sd = 4.0, median = 10). This bias results from the different numbers of persons mentioned as being important for the provision of goods: in 1992 the mean size of this part of the personal network was 3.4 (sd = 3.2, median = 3) and in 1993 it was 2.1 (sd = 1.4, median = 2). Persons who delivered goods through informal contacts seem more likely to be forgotten. The numbers of network-neighbours mentioned in the retrospective networks at both points of retrospective measurement do not differ significantly. Table 2 presents the composition of our sample and shows the way it compares with the general population. As can be seen, vocational training is somewhat overestimated in our samples. It is, however, comparable with figures for larger cities in the former GDR (see Roski, 1991) . Therefore, no weighting procedure was applied.
The questions used for the delineation of personal networks were based on Fischer's exchange method (Fischer, 1982) . Of course, we adapted the name-eliciting questions to the situation in East Germany and to our particular research interest (see Appendix 1). Names or initials were asked of interaction partners who shared an activity with the respondent in a particular social situation such as giving advice about problems at work, helping to get a job or a house, providing scarce goods, spending leisure time with, or discussing personal or political matters. We also asked for the names of those who were not trusted. Ties to persons with whom one discussed personal matters are considered to be core ties. Ties that were important for the discussion of personal as well as political matters were thought to constitute the niche. In total we used 18 name-generating questions to describe how the networks of our respondents appeared in the situation before November 1989. Moreover, respondents. were encouraged to mention 5 names per question, but it was also possible to mention more. The time frame for each question was six months (March 1989-September 1989).
All name-eliciting questions focused on authentic situations, not on hypothetical situations in which one might need another's help. One drawback of our method might be that answers depend on actually encountering the need for this type of help: for example, if one had not been ill during these six months, it did not make much sense to answer a question about who provided help in cases of illness. However, not only did we employ a multitude of name generators, our items also referred to problems most people have a fair chance of meeting during a six-month period. Moreover, because we asked for real interactions we can be reasonably sure that we are not dealing with figments of the imagination.
Once names had been elicited, additional questions were asked about the relationship between the person named (referred to as the 'alter') and the respondent (frequency of contact, duration, closeness, role relation, etc.) and personal characteristics of the alter (education, occupation, age, sex) to interpret the names mentioned and to establish how much and what kind of social capital a tie represented.
Like Fischer (1982) and most other students of neighbours, we left it to the respondents themselves to define 'neighbours', except in the cases where those who were reported as neighbours lived more than 5 km. away. These network members were not included in the analyses.6 In addition to neighbours in the network we also asked some questions about Measuring other characteristics of the egos and alters was straightforward: educational level was measured as highest educational certificate attained; occupation was determined using the occupational codes, which were especially devised for the occupational titles of the former GDR, since an ordinary occupational prestige scale had never constructed for the former GDR (Mayer and Solga, 1993). The codes also include a measurement for the qualification needed in a certain occupation (unskilled/ skilled worker, skilled craftsman, technical college, or university). Persons with a political function were given a separate code. The codes can be compared with the ISCO codes for occupations (see ILO, 1990 ). However, they do not provide information on the prestige of an occupation. Therefore we also coded the data according to the German version of Treiman's international prestige scale (Treiman, 1977 (Treiman, , 1979 . Finally, we also asked the respondents whether they felt politically controlled, whether they lacked any goods in their household, and what arrangements they made to meet certain kinds of eventualities. All interviews lasted between 2 and 2.5 hours.
Results
The Tables 3  and 4 show the regression analyses for the social distribution of different kinds of facilities. We used a person's occupational prestige in 1989, his political function, age, and the number of persons in his household as independent variables. According to the official rule, the number of children or the presence of grandparents in a household were the main criteria for allocating larger houses and having better facilities. These rules were supported by our findings, as can be seen in the Tables. Table 3 further shows that those who had a political function had more rooms, which was also in line with the official norm. In addition, older people had more rooms.7 Table 4 concerns additional indicators of the standard of living such as having a car, a phone, or a Datsche (a small cottage in the countryside). We did not find any effects arising from the sector in which an individual worked, his education, or vocational training. Table 4 shows that a political function did not help to explain how these highly desired goods were distributed.8 Again, age is positively related with all items. Moreover, one's occupational prestige affects all indices. However, in general the models are not very powerful (see McFadden-R2).
In conclusion, it seems that housing policy in the former GDR was consistent with the official law. However, occupational prestige also influenced an individual's standard of living. We should note that an equal distribution of different quality houses is no proof of social mixing. More important from the perspective of the tenets of the ideology is the niches, the circles of close, trustworthy others, form the most homogeneous part of the networks. Nextdoor neighbours were about as occupationally dissimilar as the people who provided the respondent with goods that were in short supply.
Contacts within a neighbourhood in general did not add up to much, and this is in line with the opinion of the residents themselves (this analysis is not presented here). Kahl (1993) has already described the GDR as a society with typically bad relations between neighbours.
We compared the heterogeneity of next-door neighbours and network-neighbours while applying the index for qualitative variation not only for employment sector but also for the vocational training required and for the specific occupation. Table 5 shows that all differences between the pairs of IQVs are significant. Next we compared our findings with the results of Laumann (1966). We recoded the occupations of neighbours in our data-set according to the coding scheme used in Laumann's study. The categories he used were: top professional business, semi-professional business, clerical small business, skilled, and semi-skilled/unskilled. Table 6 shows the occupational status of next-door neighbours by respondent's occupational status. Table 7 shows the same for the neighbours in the personal network.
The values on the diagonal of Table 6 show that next-door neighbours were not as often in the same Table 7 are all higher than those in Table 6 , with the exception of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Of all neighbours in a personal network, 27 per cent had the same occupational status according to this coding.
We applied the so-called diagonalization ratio, a measure also used by Laumann, in order to compare our findings more precisely to Laumann's findings. The measure can be interpreted as the proportion of frequencies falling into the diagonal that is higher (or lower) than the frequency to be expected by chance.9 The diagonalization ratio (Ratio D) is remarkable low for next-door neighbours, that is 0.02, and indicates that the proportion of next-door neighbours falling into the diagonal of the matrix is no higher than what one would expect by chance. This proportion is higher for neighbours in the network, that is 0.24. Ratio D for the neighbours in the network in the former GDR is even lower than its value for nextdoor neighbours in the Laumann study, i.e. 0.42, a result that is plausible if one takes into account that the 'supply' of persons within the neighbourhood that could be selected in a personal network was quite heterogeneous in the former GDR.
So, the Marxist elite in the GDR was obviously very successful in mixing the social composition of the neighbourhood, as well as indistributing housing of different quality equally. However, it totally failed in creating friendship between the classes. The fact that there is some interaction with neighbours further away in the neighbourhood and little friendship and hardly any interaction between nextdoor neighbours is a total reversal of the association of propinquity and interaction that is usually found in the West.
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. . IHow are 'neighbours' represented in the personal networks of citizens before the political upheaval? Table 8 Of course, the relationship to a particular person can have various functions or contents of interaction. The mean number of interaction contents of a relationship, the multiplexity in neighbour networks, was 1.8 (sd 3, range 1-4), for the time under communist rule. This value is not much lower than the average multiplexity of the whole network (2.2, sd .8).
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In the GDR neighbours were only weakly connected to the respondent. The proportion of weak ties in neighbour networks before the political change was rather high (64 per cent weak, 12 per cent strong, 24 per cent medium). Since so many neighbours in the networks were persons who were not trusted, we investigated what multiplexity and tie-strength would look like if we included those who were trusted, or more precisely, were not named as 'not trusted'. Generally, about one third of neighbour ties were not regarded as trustworthy."11 The strength of the ties to the 'trustworthy' neighbours was not much higher: the ties to neighbours remained mostly weak (44 per cent weak, 38 per cent medium, 18 per cent strong). However, the multiplexity of ties to such neighbours was notably higher: the average increases to 2.9 if one excludes ties based on distrust.
Campbell and Lee (1992:1087), in about the only existing study on multiplexity and strength of ties between neighbours, provide findings that can be usefully compared. They report that ties between neighbours in their Nashville sample have an average multiplexity of 1.3, when 9 name generators rather similar to ours were used. They also describe ties between neighbours as rather weak (on average 1.2 on a 4-point scale of closeness).
Thus we can conclude that, just as in the West, relationships with neighbours were used for a variety of purposes, although mainly for instrumental support and to a lesser extent for company. These ties were generally weak. A major difference is that neighbours play a far smaller part in the lives of GDR citizens, that they were kept out of the corenetworks, and moreover they were very often seen as a liability. Far from being an asset, they were seen as posing a threat.
Up to this point, we have not established whether people in the GDR actually lacked various kinds of goods, and whether they had alternative ways of attaining them other than through informal channels. We have also yet to establish whether they felt controlled. Because of reasons of space we will not present all the data and the full analysis here (for more information see Vlker, 1995: 159, 220). People reported that they lacked particular goods that could 256 1 not be obtained at the market, such as tools to repair things, fruit and vegetables, children clothes, shoes, electronic equipment, and furniture. Most of them also lacked other ways of obtaining these items and had to rely on the route of informal help. The black market, exquisite shops,West-Mark, or Forumchecks were hardly mentioned. Moreover, people also felt controlled in their living sphere, though even more so at work and during their education. Furthermore, the more neighbours people had in their network, the more controlled they felt.
In At the level of the alter we included variables referring to characteristics of the relationship between ego and alter, such as closeness, type of role relation, whether the tie involved a work relationship, whether the alter worked in the same domain as the respondent, and, of course, whether it involved a tie to a neighbour. At the level of alter we also included a characteristic of the alter, i.e. political function. Moreover, we also included sample and interactions between sample and important variables in the analyses to control for possible biases that might stem from using different samples. Table  9 shows the coefficients of the variables at the level of the ego (= the respondents) and the alter (= the relationship). Previous analyses (not shown here) had already indicated that other characteristics of ego and alter, like sex, or membership of the SED, were not significant in explaining distrust, so we left them out of the analyses presented here. Weak ties also have a higher chance of being loaded with distrust. Moreover, having dissimilar occupations also increased the chance of distrust. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, there is no connection between political function and distrust. It turns out that, at the level of the respondents, a higher education promotes chances of distrust, a finding that is contrary to findings in the West that more educated and affluent people are more trusting (see Fischer, 1982: 245) . Furthermore, the significant random effect indicates that, although on average neighbours are associated with distrust, there are significant differences between respondents with regard to distrust of neighbours. Table 9 shows in addition that the effect of 'neighbour' on the likelihood of distrust is higher than the effect of 'similarity of occupational domains' The interaction between the two variables (not included in the model) was not significant. Being someone's neighbour is a more important characteristic for the explanation of 'distrust' than being socially different.
Are the people who had neighbours in their 1989 networks different from those who did not? We did not find any significant differences when we inquired into absolute or relative number of 
Conclusion and Discussion
The major conclusion of our study on neighbours in the former GDR is that if socialist societies are not only considered as experiments in destratification but also in creating friendship among the classes, then the communist regime of the GDR was fairly successful in distributing quality housing equally between the classes, and in mixing social classes in the neighbourhood, but that it failed to create friendship between the classes. Important relations with next-door neighbours were practically nonexistent, and ties to other persons within the neighbourhood were relatively rare, not intensive, and restricted to socially similar others. Communist housing policy, in fact, failed to decrease the social distance between neighbours and to create a more open society.
The success and failure of GDR housing policy becomes more obvious if we compare our research to what is known from research on neighbours in democratic industrial societies. In these societies quality housing is more or less unequally distributed among the classes, and there is social segregation of neighbourhoods. However, there is also rather extensive interaction among neighbours, and this is most intensive between next-door neighbours.
Moreover, neighbours are not blocked out of each other's intimate networks, and class is not of overriding importance in deciding with whom to interact.
Obviously in a one-party state with a command economy, a regime can determine the composition of a neighbourhood, but it cannot force neighbours to interact and like each other. Why did the regime not succeed in actually levelling out social differences in everyday social interaction, and in realizing a convivium of comrades? We understand these phenomena as the unintended consequences of the Marxist belief system, the Leninist one-party system, and the ensuing and all-encompassing political control14 (see Reve, 1969) . People knew about this control. Because of the far-reaching consequences that allegations of being a class-enemy or of being merely a less-than-eager comrade would cause, and because it was far from clear who were the unofficial informants of the Stasi, this control constantly forced people to consider whether others were to be trusted. The risk of being denounced was greater if strangers were concerned, especially dissimilar others or people forced on one by circumstances, such as neighbours and workmates. Neighbours are a special case: because of propinquity they have access to the private sphere of those who live next-door. A major finding of our study corroborates this argument: ties with neighbours and with socially dissimilar others had a greater chance of being loaded with distrust.
In the case of communist societies our investment theory of social relations as social capital has to be augmented with an auxiliary assumption about the influence of risk of loss through misplaced trust.
People invest in others with an eye to the present value of future help from others in achieving wellbeing and social approval, while taking into account the possible dangers of losing everything through misplaced trust'in such people as neighbours, and especially next-door neighbours. So, these choices or non-choices among neighbours can be understood as a way of dealing with the problem of whom to trust. Not only were neighbours generally avoided and contacts with them kept to a minimum, they were consequently excluded from core networks and used only in instrumental dealings.
Neighbours did not act as substitutes, if someone had a network with less support form others. Moreover contacts within the neighbourhood were restricted to instrumental dealings with similar others. A telling result in this respect is that neighbours sometimes provided each other with information on politics but they hardly ever expressed their political opinions or discussed politics. Next-door neighbours were not even activated for instrumental support. Our results are in line with other studies on relationships among members of work collectives in the GDR, which also demonstrated the lack of contact between higher and lower ranks (Erbe, 1982 Lipset and Bence, 1994). One could even argue the opposite: nowadays people feel more free to talk about people they did not trust because these persons can no longer harm them. This leads to the conclusion that retrospective data might more reliable.
12. The data were aggregated to the level of the respondents, which means that not all available information on the relationships between respondents (ego) and their network members (alters) and on the characteristics of the alters is used. All relational data and characteristics of alters are reported by the respondents and one cannot assume that these relationships can be treated as statistically (and theoretically) independent from each other. The mutual dependence of relationships within a personal network would, strictly speaking, forbid the use of OLS methods on all relational data. In addition, if we want to investigate the functions of relationships the dependent variable is at the level of the relationship. Multi-level modelling enables us to take the nested structure of the network data (the alters are 'nested' within the ego) into account (see e.g. DiPrete and Forristal, 1994; Snijders eta/., 1995). The main advantage of applying hierarchical linear modelling in the analysis of personal networks is that it allows for the case that for each respondent the regression equation of X on Y may be different, that is, random. The intercept as well as the regression coefficient are dependent on the respondent. 13. Under the null hypotheses that the models are not different, the difference in variance is chi-square distributed (with n df). 14. One should make finer distinctions between types of ideology within democratic states (cf. Ultee, Arts, and Flap, 1992). E.g. it has been said of the Netherlands that it is a relatively cohesive society, knowing no sharp class divisions, nor, although there is an ongoing influx of immigrants, any large ethnic segregation, because the government and local authorities oftenworked to counteract such tendencies by specific zoning policies and a welfare system that provides subsidies to those whose income does not allow them to pay for a house with a high rent but who, with a subsidy, are still able to live in houses in more expensive neighbourhoods.
15. Lindenberg (1993) presents an argument on how behavioural alternatives might be differently framed because of the risk of losing something valuable. In such situations loss-avoidance will become the main goal and will dominate all other goals, including those associated with attaining physical well-being and social approval.
